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On the Responsiveness of Supply Chains
Introduction
Much research on the concept of supply chain management (SCM) has already been
undertaken. By and large, however, current research does not deal with the ontological question
where do supply chains come from? They are simply seen as a boundary condition for doing
business, as when, for example, Christopher and Towell (2000) state:
Identification is growing with the idea that individual businesses no longer compete as stand-alone
entities but rather as supply chains. We are now entering the era of network-competition.

Meanwhile, different ‘SCM-practice’ studies suggest that practitioners find it difficult to
implement supply chain management. Fawcett and Magnan (2002) find that SCM is not widely
adopted by industry and that supply chain practice rarely resembles the theoretical ideals (or
prescriptions). Identifying with the idea of competing as a supply chain is easy; recognizing what
this idea implies is difficult. As suggested by Price (1996), current theories fail to recognize that
the problems in reality are more social and less technical, and, as Frohlich and Westbrook (2001)
conclude even though the fundamental importance of supply chains is widely accepted,
important questions remain open about how to characterize them.
Our goal is to explore the SCM creation process, and in particular our interest is to
understand the way organizations decide on the mechanisms for integrating on an interorganizational basis. According to current SCM theory, choosing mechanisms should be easy,
given that supply chain integration can be thought of in terms of two ‘decoupling points’: One is
informational and one is material (Christopher and Towell, 2000). On the basis of simulation
studies, Mason-Jones and Towill (1997) suggest there is evidence for the argument that the
responsiveness of supply chains increases the further ‘decoupling points’ can be extended apart.

Information Decoupling Point

<<< Upstream
Suppliers

Customers

Supply Chain Responsiveness

Downstream >>>

Material Decoupling Point

Operations Planning

Customer Responsiveness

Figure 1. Decoupling points - A measure of supply chain responsiveness

The ‘informational decoupling point’ refers to the furthest point upstream to which
information on real final demand can penetrate the supply chain. In contrast, the ‘material
decoupling point’ refers to the furthest point downstream to which products/services can be
modularized or versionized and still remain adaptable to customer specifications. As Hoekstra
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and Romme (1992) argue, the assumption of a decoupling point is that one can separate the
supply chain in two parts, of which the downstream part is geared towards responding to
customers orders and the upstream part is geared towards coordinated planning. Through this
assumption the challenges of supply chain management become a matter of optimization. As
challenging and interesting as this question may be by itself, this assumption can also be
problematic because it distracts our attention from the underlying question where do supply
chains come from?
As Frohlich and Westbrook (2001) argue, a significant problem with current theories on
supply chain management is that they all too often simply draw on banners such as ‘world class
manufacturing’ (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984); ‘lean management’ (Womack and Jones, 1991);
and ‘electronic data interchange’ (EDI) (Sheombar, 1992; Bowersox and Daugherty, 1995). Most
of these banners prescribe what corporations should do, but often these prescriptions are not
sufficiently operational (Heikkilä, 2002) to be meaningful for corporations to act on. It seems
that we do not yet know enough about the processes through which supply chains come about
(Flynn et al, 1999) and as a result we revert to assuming that they are simply a product of the
ways organizations trade off ‘price’ and ‘quality’ with each other (Cousins, 2002). As Choi et al
(2001) suggest, we need to sophisticate our simplistic notion of ‘systemness’ which currently
appears to take for given that all organizations within a value chain (Porter, 1985) are equally
important links and that they interact as a unified virtual business entity (Tan, 2001).
If there is increasing identification with the idea that we are entering the era of networkcompetition, we believe that it is relevant to explore how these networks come about; and if there
is an assumption that supply chain responsiveness is a function of how far it is possible to extend
some ‘decoupling points’, we believe it is important to explore how organizations locate these
‘decoupling points’. For that purpose we draw on the actor-network approach which suggests
understanding the phenomena as ‘networkings’ (Latour, 1999). What we will do in the following
pages is trace discussions about supply chain management in two organizations and, in
particular, we study the different types of arguments about where to locate the ‘decoupling
points’. In tracing the arguments different parties bring into play, we draw on the ‘boundaries of
the firm’ (Penrose, 1959) and on ‘transaction costs’ (Williamson, 1985).
The purpose of the case studies is not to measure the extent to which two corporations
have implemented a certain definition of SCM. Rather the intent is to explore (a) the discursive
process through which SCM is invented locally and in doing so to explore (b) arguments about
how manufacturing and managerial competence translate into concerns about supply chain
responsiveness.
Our research contrasts past research by illustrating how ‘decoupling points’ in practice
are outcomes rather than determinants of ‘responsiveness’ because the supply chain itself is a
function of the firm rather than an environmental variable in relation to which the firm operates.
Our research illustrates why supply chain management is primarily a matter of crafting internal
networks in relation to certain ideas about ‘firm boundaries’ based on the perceived ‘transaction
costs’ associated with different ways of organizing managerial and manufacturing competences

©2005 Sprouts 3(4) pp 211-232, http://sprouts.case.edu/2003/030411.pdf
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/3-17

213

DECHOW/ON THE RESPONSIVENESS OF SUPPLY CHAINS

Research Method and Empirical Basis
Our case studies are based on two firms that we refer to as respectively SuperDesign and
EuroOil. The corporations are not competitors. They work in different markets. Both of them are
recognized as leaders within their respective industries. Within the oil-industry EuroOil is
recognized for its innovate production techniques, and in the consumer market for audio/video
products Super Design is recognized for the combination of high-tech and superior aesthetic
looks. In each their respective markets both companies are recognized for their superior
engineering skills.
Traditionally, both corporations have used large pools of suppliers and have not made
efforts to cooperate with anyone in particular. In the past both corporations have always
produced strategic components in-house, whereas non-strategic components were sourced from
suppliers; and these were handled through arms-length agreements. Times have changed
however, and in both corporations top management have launched supply chain management as
a strategic imperative.
In both corporations the purchasing functions were among the most proactive to mobilize
SCM and in both organizations their drive was based on the idea of creating supplier portfolios.
In EuroOil, the purchasing function made explicit reference to Kraljic’s (1983) HBR-article
‘purchasing must become supply management’. The objectives in both organizations were very
much in line with the general purchasing and supply perspective in current SCM literature
throughout the 1990s (see for example Tan, 2001), which was to: 1/ reduce the base of suppliers;
2/ involve some of the suppliers in RandD in order to speed the time-to-market ration and to 3/
reduce over all costs. In addition, both organizations wanted to ‘catch up with’ recent trends in
the broader field of operations management - ‘world class manufacturing’ and ‘lean
management’ in particular. These objectives created the basis for those discussions between
different departments that we explore in the following.
Data collection, data analysis and theory building are closely related: they form an
iterative process. There are two levels to our case-study analysis. Following Miles and
Huberman (1994) the first round of our analysis was a ‘within-case-analysis,’ followed by a
‘cross-case-analysis,’ where the corporations were compared.
We conducted 22 interviews. In each organization one respondent was interviewed
several times to confirm observations, elaborate on themes, and retrieve and discuss
supplementary documentations materials. Our data reliability improved because of these
iterations – although additional iterations with several respondents would of course have reduced
the risk of becoming subject to undue influence from any of our respondents (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Yin, 1984). The latter risk we, however, find mitigated by the fact that our data analysis is based
on full-length transcriptions of all 22 interviews. During our first round of analysis we explored
the themes that were unique to each organization and we traced how the networking in each
organization compared to the other. Brown and Capdevilla (1999) describe this approach the
following way:
What the actor-network approach does is to take the end as its beginning and run counter to all
chronology, moving ‘backwards’ to the flowering and beginning of networks. It makes the most
curious of folds, where ‘after’ becomes ‘before’ the beginning. (P.35)

Another way to describe this approach is to compare it to archeological studies in a realtime setting. Whenever we encountered a theme, we started tracing its constituents, its origins
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and its impact. During our within case analysis our work was to establish contextual coherence
from observations and information garnered from the interviews.
The purpose of the following cross-case analysis was to search for cross-patterns,
although our objective was not to search for a ‘generalizable’ truth, which we leave squarely in
the hands of the reader to decide. Rather than focusing on what the arguments themselves
propose, the purpose of our cross comparison was to explore what the arguments altogether
convey about a process that is both social and technical. In other words, we are mainly interested
in the local ‘stories’ as vehicle for understanding the mechanisms through which manufacturing
and management competences are networked on an inter-organizational basis.

Case Studies
The SCM Vision at EuroOil and SuperDesign: Trusting, Lean and Agile
In both EuroOil and SuperDesign, top management had a vision about SCM. Contracts
were to be replaced by trust in order to be able to gain leverage on their knowledge, contracts
were to be replaced by trust in the early stages of product development, and product costing was
to be used to clarify for all parties the ‘fair costs’ at different stages of the product and
technology life cycles.
As such, these visions correspond with the attributes of both ‘lean management’ and
‘agile management’ (for example, Naylor, Naim and Berry 1997; Mason-Jones et al. 2000). In
both companies these visions were crafted in the early 1990s, a time when manufacturing had
become a strategic agenda, not the least because of a stream of manufacturing publications based
on books on ‘world class manufacturing’ (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984); ‘lean management’
(Womack, Jones and Ross, 1991); and books on 'industrial networks’ by Johansson and
Mattsson (1987). The extent to which these works had been used specifically as sources for the
vision, we do not know. However, the important point is that the SCM vision resonated with
state-of-the-art management banners without making clear, for example, how the vision of lean
was to be balanced against the vision of trust-based supplier relationships, the idea of being
agile, etc.
Through their visions, top management sent signals into their respective organizations
that something was about to change, and their ‘eclecticness’ made it possible for people to take
different positions. As a manager in SuperDesign stated, “This is about creating a path into the
future”; but, as another manager from EuroOil acknowledged, visions can be difficult to work
with:
It’s interesting, when you write something it seems that everybody agrees with you. Afterwards
most people nevertheless have no idea how to realize it.

The case in both corporations was that progress came slowly because different parties
understood the same vision differently. In both organizations, the purchasing functions argued
that it would be possible to create a ‘decoupling point’ very close to manufacturing if only they –
the purchasing functions – were allowed to represent the suppliers at the product-design stage.
Against this position the engineering departments in both organizations argued that the
‘decoupling point’ had to be placed much further upstream given that suppliers for various
reasons could not be ‘trusted’ to take over elements of the design work.
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Management’s vision stated the objectives but did not provide direction. Instead they
provided vocabularies by which different parties in SuperDesign and EuroOil could discuss the
transformation from being a ‘firm’ to becoming clusters of particular manufacturing and
managerial competences. The case studies illustrate that the debate was not about whether and
where the two companies had ‘core competences’ and it was not a discussion about whether or
not things could be outsourced. What people disagreed about was how the core competences
could be and should be nurtured. And therefore the debate was about the ‘transaction cost’
anticipated with different types of supply chain management scenarios.
SCM at SuperDesign
The following two sections introduce the cases one by one. We begin with the study of
SuperDesign, where we focus on the three positions we encountered at different places in the
organization. Each of these positions differs with regard to how they approach the SCM vision.
First, there is the ‘technology-mapping project’. This project was launched by corporate staff so
that SuperDesign could decide how SCM should rank its various competences and determine
which parts could be outsourced to suppliers.
Second, we introduce the purchasing function. They argued that in the future
SuperDesign could rely much more on the design and manufacturing competences of its
suppliers if only it focused a little more on the way these suppliers are managed. The purchasing
function challenged the firms engineering departments, who traditionally have kept all designrelated activities in-house. The rhetoric employed by the purchasing function argued that a
greater degree of involvement with suppliers could reduce the cost of doing transactions. In
particular, their rhetoric focused on the part of the corporate SCM vision in favor of lean
management. Their position was that there would be no transaction costs for SuperDesign in
changing its ways of designing new products – only gains.
The engineering departments strongly opposed this suggestion – not because they were
against the SCM vision but because they did not think design responsibility could be extended
across corporate boundaries. The engineers said design is one of the most important attributes of
SuperDesign products. It’s not that they didn’t trust suppliers. They simply thought that
involving suppliers in this part of the job would increase not only the costs of transactions but
also the overall ‘transaction costs’ because SuperDesign would be limiting its design creativity.
The Technology-Mapping Project. The technology-mapping project at SuperDesign
was launched by the strategic planning department as an attempt to drive the organization
towards taking a rational approach to implementing SCM. As the project manager pointed out:
It’s a process – I mean, the result doesn’t count as much as the fact that everybody in purchasing
and everybody in engineering will have to familiarize themselves with our operational processes.
It will make them build a lot of knowledge about what and how we are doing.

The tool for this learning process was a relatively simple map that required everyone to
evaluate the extent to which a work process added customer value to the final product (‘external
productivity’) and the extent to which SuperDesign was performing this process better (internal
productivity) than any current or potential supplier would be able to do:
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Technology Mapping

External Productivity
(Design/Idea – Content & Specification)
High
Low
Middle

Internal Productivity
(Competitive Advantage)

SuperDesign

Strong

Neutral

Weak

Figure 2. The Technology Mapping Matrix
The project manager continued:
The whole point of this exercise is to look at how much this knowledge contributes to the value
that customers perceive. Well, of course you can’t ask customers about this. It’s impossible
because they can’t see the processes. But we can do it – at least we can assess it and that is what
we do. You know, an important process will be placed in the top right corner. The whole point is
to assess which of our capabilities contribute to our competitive advantage. If we are not at least as
good as the market – then we are ‘weak’. And if we outperform the market, then we are ‘strong’ –
and that will be in terms of prices, quality, logistics – everything. We include everything here.
However, we do not attempt to calculate it. It’s all about using common knowledge.

The assumption behind this project was that SuperDesign -- driven by the needs of
particular projects – should be and would be able to integrate people, functions and competences
across corporate boundaries. Purchasing had no problems with this project. They saw it as an
opportunity to reorient the organization towards realizing the potential value of administrative
resources and away from its almost exclusive focus on design and manufacturing resources. In
order to mobilize this new view of the organization, purchasing focused on finding examples that
current production costs were unrealistically high because designers did not create products that
were designed for manufacturability.
SCM according to SuperDesign’s purchasing function. At the beginning of our
interviews with the purchasing function, several examples were given to illustrate that current
manufacturing costs were unrealistically high simply because product design did not take
manufacturing costs seriously. The purchasing officer provided examples:
Right now we have a supplier where we scrap eighty percent of the steel they supply. It’s because
the process we ask for is close to impossible. However, we need the steel for one of our top-of-theline products. It’s unfortunate and of course the high scrap level means that we have to monitor
that supplier very closely.
Another example of special cases is a supplier in Austria. Really, his main market is the dairy
industry. But we were very fortunate to find him, because we can find no one else who can
produce a cone – a component for another top-of-the-line product – like he can. You know, it’s
really a small place. The owner himself is working for us together with a few people. It’s really
only a workshop. But currently we are very dependent on him.
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Traditionally, product development has been done without any involvement of suppliers and
without using the purchasing officer’s knowledge - simply because engineers often appeared to
take great pleasure in traveling around to make arrangements with a supplier with a sense of
craftsmanship that they considered similar to their own.

Purchasing wanted to change this regime and in their mind the SCM vision meant that
SuperDesign should consider substituting some of its design and engineering competences with
new administrative practices/resources which the purchasing function could deliver. The
purchasing function wanted to be more involved in the design of new products. They wanted to
act as ‘boundary spanners’ (Tushman and Scanlan, 1981) between suppliers and the engineering
functions at SuperDesign. The objective the purchasing function attributed to this role was to
find ways to reduce costs:
…we ourselves should participate in calculating what the price should be. We believe in ‘open
book’ calculations – and that means we know how much the different things cost – materials,
packaging, transportation, wages, overhead. It means that we are there already before the thing is
created and that is why we can negotiate a fair price with the supplier…

Whereas the technology-mapping project was designed to create the basis for an unbiased
decision about where to place the decoupling points in relation to suppliers, purchasing was on a
mission to place the decoupling point as close to operations as possible in order to integrate
suppliers in the design process. The premise for making this happen, however, was that
SuperDesign would be able to extend its design competence to suppliers and manage this
extension via managerial procedures. At SuperDesign such a thing had never been tried before.
Design competences had always been founded in manufacturing skills exclusively.
SCM according to SuperDesign’s design and engineering functions. Engineering was
not against ‘open book calculations’. Their concern was that it would not be possible to articulate
the company’s design competence to suppliers. The response from the engineering department
was as follows:
Although this is a nice proposal in theory, it wouldn’t work in practice since the capability to
develop superior product design is something that is inherent in our corporate culture. You can’t
outsource the skills of a SuperDesign craftsman without losing the SuperDesign. You have to be
competent. You have to know what you are talking about. You need this surplus of technical skills
and knowledge so that you just know what is and what isn’t possible. It is not enough simply to
sketch our good ideas on paper drawings.

The engineering department responded with a technical argument. In theory, the proposal
to move the decoupling point back to the point of product design was nice. However, in practice,
engineering did not think that it was possible to stretch this competence across organizational
departments. In their view, there was (Williamsonian) ‘transaction gain’ involved with this
approach that the purchasing function did not take into account when arguing they could reduce
the costs of transactions. As the following respondent explains the ‘transaction gain’ by keeping
design internal allowed the company to rely on tacit product knowledge and corporate culture as
mechanisms that would ensure ‘the right feel’ to a SuperDesign product:
All the things that are difficult to specify – the tacit stuff – is exactly what makes it difficult to
outsource. It’s in our culture and you can’t outsource this knowledge to someone who on the one
hand produces high quality but on the other hand is not able to get the finish right. It always ends
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up in an argument that their products are/are not good enough according to the specifications.
And we just can’t make them understand that it simply doesn’t have the little extra that can’t be
specified.
The thing is we can specify and specify and then specify a little more. However, we don’t when
working with things ourselves. We specify to a certain level and then we stop, knowing
comfortably that our culture will pick up where we leave things. This only works if we do things
by ourselves.

The engineering departments were not against involving the purchasing department.
Their position was simply that it was not possible because SuperDesign would make itself
dependent on the extent to which suppliers would incorporate ‘SuperDesign craftsmanship’ in
their work. Where purchasing wanted to pull back the decoupling point in order to include
suppliers in the design of products, the engineering departments argued that customer
expectation would not permit this kind of integration because there is a difference between
meeting a technical standard and meeting the customers’ expectations. An ‘informational
decoupling point’ in other words was pulled into the discussion in order to defend the current
location of the material decoupling point. However, what the engineering function argued (in
contrast to current SCM theory) was that SuperDesign would only be able to maintain its
responsiveness to final customers if it kept suppliers at arm’s length. In order to make this
argument, certain aspects of technological complexity were unraveled in such ways that
everyone could see that the ‘material decoupling point’ shares many properties with the
‘informational decoupling point’ and in such ways that SuperDesign could only maintain its
downstream responsiveness by keeping the material and the information decoupling points as
close as possible.
What this also illustrates is that the SCM debate in SuperDesign had launched two very
different positions on the competences of the firm. One was the old one in which competence
associated exclusively with manufacturing and design skills. The other - represented by the
purchasing function – was new arguing that SuperDesign’s competence could only be nurtured if
it improved its ability to blend manufacturing and managerial procedures. But engineering did
not agree, as illustrated by the following statement:
You know, the only thing that makes us different from everyone else in this business is that we are
focused on the design – the product. Everyone else focuses on the process. That’s why their design
lags behind - because everything is designed for manufacturability. If you constantly focus on the
manufacturing process, you will never produce innovative products. Then you are only following
the beaten-path. We, in contrast, emphasize the product.

On the basis of the input from the purchasing department and the design and engineering
departments respectively, the technology-mapping project at the same time made a lot of sense
as it was also about to prove its own impossibility. The purpose of our project was to create an
objective basis on which to decide where to create the decoupling points. The positions provided
by the purchasing and engineering functions illustrate that the basis of inter-organizational
relationships was not the separability of activities but rather the extent to which competences
could be spanned across organizational spaces. In order for SuperDesign to compete as a supply
chain it would have to include suppliers in the design process. This would require the company
to examine how it associated own manufacturing with own managerial procedures, internally. As
the engineering department pointed out, this is not just a matter of doing a cost calculation.
Altering the current regime altered the ‘transaction costs’ – i.e., the choices available to
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SuperDesign. The cost savings earned from including the suppliers might not mitigate the
potential adverse effect of no longer focusing primarily on the craftsmanship customers expect to
find in the products
At SuperDesign the supply chain in other words was not definable through the
decoupling points the technology-mapping project tried to establish simply because Supply
Chain Management does not begin where competitive advantages end. On the contrary, company
discussions illustrate that supply chain management is a matter of finding out how far it is
possible to stretch out the competences that define SuperDesign and at what cost. Supply chain
management therefore does not begin where SuperDesign ends. On the contrary, the possibility
for supply chain management ends at the point where SuperDesign is no longer able to ensure
that the supplier is able to produce what the customer expects. SCM therefore ends where
SuperDesign is no longer able to connect and coordinate the informational with the material
‘decoupling points’.
SCM at EuroOil
EuroOil is a very different company. Where SuperDesign designs and produces
sophisticated audio and video equipment, EuroOil engages with large turn-key projects drilling
for off-shore oil.
The traditional work process would follow a path where EuroOil first wrote a detailed
specification of almost everything down to the size and quality of nuts and bolts after which it on
the one hand assigned a contractor to take over the project but on the other hand continued to
review whether specified requirements were met. Decoupling points had been very important as
a demarcation of responsibilities in the turn-key projects.
With the new SCM vision, the purchasing function at EuroOil began to mobilize in very
similar ways to the purchasing function at SuperDesign, but again, engineering was reluctant to
follow the new approach. But, whereas SCM at SuperDesign was a question of how far and at
what cost the company could stretch competences out to suppliers the question at EuroOil was:
how closely could they allow suppliers to become partners in their turn-key projects? In other
words, it was a problem of how close EuroOil could allow itself to connect the material and the
informational decoupling points.
EuroOil SCM - the engineering way. Engineering departments at EuroOil described
their practice as one of double-checking everything their suppliers did. Decoupling points were
important as a means to allow EuroOil engineering departments to double-loop everything the
suppliers worked on. This was necessary because EuroOil carried all liability in relation to these
turn-key projects. Because the oil rigs were controlled by EuroOil, it would not be possible to
blame suppliers if an accident happened – not even if suppliers were de facto responsible:
So really, if you look reality in the eye this is back to what I said before – we normally did the job
2 or 3 times. We would employ a company to do the work for us. But on top we checked up on
everything they did.
What happens is really that we have created an enormous organization to control our suppliers –
and that’s because we carry all liability.
In theory it would be much cheaper not to specify subcontracted projecting in detail. In practice,
however, it is necessary. The idea of functional specifications would leave too much space for
uncertainty, which could not be accepted as long as EuroOil carries liability for the project.
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Like the engineering departments at SuperDesign, the EuroOil engineering departments
are not against the purchasing functions’ initiative. They just don’t see how it would be possible
to allow the suppliers to become supply chain partners.
EuroOil SCM according to the purchasing function. The purchasing function saw this
very differently. To them it was a mystery that EuroOil would maintain a large organization in
order simply to control what others supposedly knew much more about:
Well, we are the ‘new kid on the block’. Our department has not existed more than five years, so
many still see us as intruders. We are trying to get a more central role, where we are closer to the
projects and closer to the suppliers. The external suppliers are really the ones that we consider as
future partners – far more than the internal EuroOil departments.

Like the purchasing department at SuperDesign, the EuroOil purchasing function saw
itself as a boundary spanner – as the supplier’s representative internally at EuroOil. But
purchasing thought that EuroOil no longer had any significant technical competence:
…we have to acknowledge that we have theoretical competence only when it comes to
engineering. We can scale a project. However, it doesn’t change that we depend on the suppliers
and their experience when it comes to operations.

Purchasing therefore took a quite aggressive stance internally at EuroOil in order to gain
some ground:
…we in the purchasing department cannot accept to be involved only on the basis of already-made
decisions…We need to change the rules of the game. People should not consider purchasing to be
a cost. It’s our investment for future revenue. The thing is that we never had an incentive to think
full costs and total life cycle. Well, we didn’t have the foundation because we didn’t have the
statistical data we have now.

Also at EuroOil the purchasing function saw that in the future cost control would be a
major function. But where SuperDesign purchasing officers talked about “open book
calculations” EuroOil focused on the concept of ‘life-cycle-costs”. However, like their
counterparts at SuperDesign, they had the idea that suppliers could be organized into pools
according to their strategic relevance:
Now we have to find out which supplier types are important to us in general – we have to think
beyond each individual project… Once we’ve established that, then we must look at the specific
suppliers and assess how they can help us develop our skills. This is, of course, all theory – it’s
not for real yet. But for sure, it will involve a completely different profile for purchasing. The
good thing is that we got an action plan that defines what we need to do in order to reach our goals
– for example, it specifies that we must standardize the equipment we are sourcing from various
suppliers.

Although the context is different, what the SCM vision spurred in both corporations was
a new tension between manufacturing and managerial competences. Purchasing departments in
both places emphasized the managerial competences, and thereby replicated much of the current
thinking in SCM theory. In each company way engineering departments pointed out that the
issue of SCM cannot be reduced meaningfully to a matter of managerial skills and
representations. But where the engineering functions at SuperDesign doubted that manufacturing
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competences could be stretched towards suppliers, at EuroOil the issue was liability: how closely
they could afford to rely on suppliers. Here, supply chain management is a matter of contractual
arrangements – or simply who to blame if something goes wrong and how to do everything
possible to avoid technical ‘mishaps’.
EuroOil SCM – from the perspective of business units. The practice of different
business units at EuroOil was to serve both parties as needed. One business unit, building a
‘floating oil rig,’ had chosen to approach the project without the assistance of the engineering
departments. Their argument was that the contractual focus traditionally endorsed by EuroOil
has become a costly practice. The business unit manager explains:
The new thing that every one is talking about is actually quite simple – we are bringing it all back
to basics, because things had become so incredibly complicated. The new thing simply is that we
are suggesting to our suppliers a partner-contract with a number of milestones. If everything
works, then we all win. If not, we will all loose.
In the contract we have taken out all clauses that produce confrontation. We don’t have any
punishment clauses. They always cause confrontation. But we have also added new clauses that
stipulate they cannot make claims against us for things we have done together in the integrated
team. It’s like a marriage if you like. If one of us makes a mistake, the other one has to accept it.
This is all based on that we have confidence in each other for a common goal.

In essence, contracts have not been eliminated. They have simply been changed in such
ways that they will always create either ‘win-win’ or ‘both-loose’ arrangements. Trust in that
sense still has a financial lever. In particular the practice of this business unit becomes interesting
when mirroring another business unit, which argues about the ways old oil-rigs need to be
managed. The business unit manager explains:
You know, they have started talking about ways of creating improvement programs – and we are
of course appreciative of these trends, too. We have asked our suppliers to come up with an
improvement program. However, it all comes down to the contract. There has to be positive and
negative aspects to it – otherwise it stays with talk and good intentions. There has to be a way that
I can punish a bad supplier and reward the good one.

This business unit follows the old ways of doing things – and thus agrees more with the
engineering department than with the purchasing department. As already mentioned, the
difference between these two business units is that they were located at each their end of two
product life cycles. The first business unit was just at the beginning - building an oil rig. The
second business unit was managing an older oil rig, where the number of surprises is few.
What these two business units point out in relation to the debate between purchasing and
the technical controllers (the engineering departments) is that SCM at EuroOil should be handled
in relation to the dynamics of the technology life cycles of turn-key installations. In context, the
question was not how far EuroOil can extend its technical competence towards suppliers. Here
the issue was about when to bring in the suppliers closely and when to manage them at arm’slength. Decoupling points in this sense are not a function of competence, but a function of time.
As explained by the latter business unit manager, there is no need to partner with suppliers when
it is possible to manage them by a contract. On the other hand, as pointed out by the first
business unit manager, it may not make sense to tie suppliers down to a contract in the early
stages of a turn-key project when reality is that both parties are mutually dependent.
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Discussion
Supply chain management does not begin at the gates of the company. Suppliers and
customers may represent the polarities of what at some point becomes a supply chain. But in
contrast to these polarities, supply chain management is about creating a meeting point of these
polarities inside the firm. In other words, supply chains do not run through corporations; they
extend from corporations and their extension depends on the ability of each corporation to make
ends meet.
In the SuperDesign and EuroOil case studies we learn that purchasing traditionally have
not been actively involved in the management of suppliers. They may have handled
administrative issues and done the paperwork, but in neither of the two organizations have they
been involved in managing suppliers. With the new SCM visions, however, they are given a
script that allows them to mobilize and make a powerful argument about why and how things
should be different. SCM vocabulary allows the purchasing functions to represent their
managerial skills as a competence from which both corporations could gain strategic leverage.
The problem with these mobilizations is that on the one had they may present ideas about what
the corporations should do; on the other hand they do not represent solutions. Overall, they
create a banner for a new debate about the corporation, its future and how to get on with the past
( Mouritsen and Dechow, 2001).
What the engineering functions in both corporations address is that changing the way
interorganizational relationships are managed doesn’t stop outside the firm. Opening this debate
also puts into question the organization of interdepartmental relationships. Those who internally
represent both the customer and the supplier also define the ‘boundaries of the firm’ – internally
and externally. In both SuperDesign and EuroOil we see that the engineering departments use
customers (SuperDesign) and the regulatory environment (EuroOil) as the argument for why the
engineering function should control the way the company interfaces with suppliers. It is not that
things could not be different, but, as they both point out, one should not change them simply
because it will reduce the cost of transactions. What is really at stake is not accounting costs but
‘transaction costs’.
The supply chain management visions challenged the corporations as to whether they can
afford to work and compete on the basis of a potentially very different set of competitive levers.
Previously both corporations had based their position on a definition of competence that has been
nurtured primarily through the manufacturing skills that both corporations possess. The SCM
visions make it possible that this could be changed in favor of a new mix of both manufacturing
and managerial skills. However, this puts the internal organization at stake. The engineering
departments illustrate how their thinking is as constrained by tradition as the purchasing
departments are limited by the prescriptive ideas on supply chain management. In both
corporations all functions start out by neglecting what they could do and would have to do
together. Drawing on Bowker and Star (1996) the prescriptive SCM text provides the purchasing
functions in both organizations with strong ‘material texture’ – a coherent text that forces their
opponents (the engineering functions) to react because a scenario is presented that could render
the past indeterminate. They therefore start out by explaining what they do, realizing that the
quality of tradition has come up for review. From a Latourian perspective what we see in the
case studies is a ‘process of enlargement’ where organizational ‘common knowledge’ (Dixon,
2000) is revisited in order to be tested for its ability to withstand criticisms and challenges
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(Briers and Chua, 2001) that are mobilized through the SCM vision in relation to the underlying
questions: Where does our supply chain come from? Where does it begin and where does it end?
What it shows us is that the supply chain comes from nowhere – except out of the firm
itself. The organization of the supply chain is an effect of the way the firm organizes itself. When
the supply chain does not have an ontology it is because the firm does not itself have a set
ontology. It may be characterized by ‘path dependence’ (Garud and Karnøe, 2001), but there is
no set definition of the firm that co-defines the supply chain. On this basis, the remainder of this
discussion is organized in three sections that address (A) the explanatory power of the
‘decoupling points’ hypothesis; (B) how the implementation of supply chain management
necessarily has to go through a process of debating intra organizational positions and finally;
and finally (C) the issue of supply chain responsiveness from a transaction cost perspective.
The Explanatory Power of ‘Decoupling Points’ Hypothesis
Even if in theory we can define the optimum location of decoupling points, locating them
is not an easy task. The assumption that one can divide the supply chain in two parts, of which
the downstream part is geared towards responding to customer orders and the upstream part is
geared towards coordinated planning (Hoekstra and Romme, 1992), in practice, is complicated
by being situated in the middle of the internal organization of the firm. Decoupling points in that
sense paradoxically is about integration – because, as the case studies illustrate, how we arrange
our interorganizational relationships depends on our intra-organizational relationships.
The hypothesis about decoupling points (Christopher and Towell, 2000) argues that the
further one is able to extend the material from the informational decoupling point the more
responsive supply chains will become. Simulations support this argument (Mason-Jones and
Towill, 1997). But a significant difference between simulations and practice is also that
simulations portray communication mechanisms as unproblematic – as if they were empty data
strings.
Our case studies show that, on the contrary, communication has significant value to many
different functions in the organization. Organizational significance comes from the ability to
represent customers and suppliers. Those who can represent both are much more powerful and
important than those who can only represent themselves. Losing the representation of suppliers is
something that the engineering functions in both corporations resist because it would alter not
only current practices but also current ways of creating supply chain responsiveness. In
SuperDesign the argument is that it is not possible to extend the design competence out to
suppliers, because they will not be able to deliver the craftsmanship that customers expect. In
EuroOil the argument is that if the engineering departments lose the opportunity to double-check
every technical specification, they will not be able to prevent a failure and a financial liability.
Obviously this argument is not as customer driven as the one at SuperDesign. The mechanisms
of the argument, however, is the same, namely that responsiveness comes from the ability to
integrate informational (customer-related) and material (supplier-related) concerns into one and
the same procedure. Instead of thinking about the material and the informational as two separate
streams of communication, the argument that the engineering departments in both companies
defend is that, in the past, core competence has been created and nurtured because of the ability
to keep them together. Our case studies do not reveal who is more right - the engineering
mobilizing the past, or the purchasing functions mobilizing the SCM visions. But they illustrate
that the hypothesis about the extension of decoupling points as a measure of the responsiveness
of supply chains in critical ways delimit our understanding of how supply chain responsiveness
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is constructed. On the basis of our studies it seems that responsiveness results much more from
the ability to integrate practices across space than from the ability to separate or decouple them.
Nevertheless, the hypothesis about ‘decoupling points’ remains powerful in one
important respect. Phrasing the problem as a matter of ‘decoupling’ resonates with the way that
the various actors in both organizations talk about the SCM vision. Even if our case studies
illustrate how the different departments in reality started a discussion about ways of integrating
manufacturing and managerial positions inside the firm, externalizing the issues at stake is the
way they go about this. Only once in our conversations with the different parties did one of them
– the purchasing department at EuroOil – put itself in the center of the discussion when stating
that they, as the new kid on the block, no longer could accept being left out of the discussions.
Otherwise, the various parties mostly externalized the discussion into matters of ‘what the
customer wants’ and ‘what the suppliers can do’. It was however as much a discussion about
internal positions at SuperDesign and EuroOil.
Managing Firm Boundaries through Information Delivery Mechanisms
The ‘decoupling points’ hypothesis does not focus on the relationships between parties in
the supply chain. Traditionally, the operations research-based modelling approach has primarily
dealt with communication as a matter of resource allocation optimisation. As Gattorna and
Walters (1996) argue, this optimisation problem has three components: (accounting) costs,
(physical) constraints and (other) conditions. The latter category encompasses broadly the
following:
Conditions [that] are logical, non-numeric characteristics that must be respected in developing the
optimum allocation of resources. They usually reflect business considerations, such as policies,
contractual obligations or customer service needs. (P.258)

As our case-studies illustrate, various parties in both SuperDesign and EuroOil spend
considerable time trying to figure out these other conditions – and they are not trivial.
On one level, the purchasing functions represent the conditions as if communication is
simply a matter of designing ‘clever’ cost control systems, i.e., ‘life-cycle costing’ at EuroOil
and ‘open-book accounting’ at SuperDesign. But on another level they talk about how their role
in conjunction with these accounting based methods of communication is to become the
‘boundary spanner’ between external suppliers and internal engineering functions. Engineering is
not thrilled about this proposal in either of the corporations and therefore offer a number of
arguments about why this is not feasible. At SuperDesign, they argue that core competences
cannot be nurtured across boundaries simply because of the amount of tacit knowledge (Polanyi,
1967), and in similar ways EuroOil engineering functions argue that the company would not be
able to take proper care of its liabilities if one were suddenly to include suppliers. Hereby our
case studies illustrate a discussion with more faces than interfacings. The various parties
challenge each other with different arguments without necessarily answering – or at least not
answering directly - to the arguments presented by their counterparts. Each of the parties are
trying to network a number of arguments into scenarios that make certain things obvious.
For purchasing, the situation is no less political than it is for engineering. The arguments
about how cost controlling should be used as means to communicate with suppliers are not
primarily about managing suppliers. The purpose of introducing new cost-accounting practices is
probably about managing suppliers. Working with ‘clever’ cost controls, however, requires that
purchasing is given more responsibility (relative to engineering). In the SuperDesign setting, cost
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control is a management tool. With this tool, purchasing is trying to build a scenario in which
SuperDesign’s core competence can be nurtured as much through management as through
manufacturing skills. The arguments used are consistent with current SCM-theory and, as argued
by the purchasing functions, their ideas are nothing exceptional. They are founded in ‘best
practice’.
The ‘side-effect’ of this scenario is that suddenly purchasing will have to play a much
more prominent role in the organization. Neither of the two engineering functions are thrilled
about it, which is why they counter by expanding on the invaluable ‘tacit dimension’ of their
work. As such, the engineering functions have no problem with the presentation of the ‘clever’
cost controls. However, they realize this is not only a presentation of a new tool, but also a
different representation of great variety of issues related to the organization of functions. The
point here is that the cost-control instrument tools do not speak by themselves. They represent an
element of a new and different SuperDesign, in which the engineering role could be at stake not
only in relation to purchasing but potentially also in relation to external suppliers – that is if
purchasing is really serious about becoming the ‘boundary spanner’ between internal and
external parties.
Engineering is not against ‘clever cost controls’. But they realize that the accounting
instruments will enable purchasing to counter and perhaps even overrule an engineering point of
view. Never before in either of these two companies have engineering functions had to take
purchasing into account. Accounting technologies are not only instruments for external
communication. They are as much instruments that can be used to reorganize the internal
boundaries of the firm in addition to the external ones.
The SCM visions may only have been launched in order to change the ways these two
corporations go about handling their interorganizational relationships. But the idea of supply
chain management reaches far beyond that, and what the various internal functions realize is that
their positions are at stake. None of them are safe. Given the SCM vocabulary, purchasing has
the opportunity to present their administrative practices as a resource that could be, and perhaps
is, strategically important to the future of the firm. Drawing on Bowker and Star (1996) what we
see is how the prescriptive text on SCM provides the purchasing functions with a strong
‘material texture’ – a coherent text that forces the engineering functions to react because
suddenly the past is rendered indeterminate. In other words the SCM vision has reopened history
and what it means to get on with the past. With the SCM manuscripts, however, the purchasing
functions can do no more than the engineering departments can do with their traditions. All of
them see that their positions are at stake – purchasing because history does not automatically
legitimise their future position, and engineering because history no longer produces accounts that
the future continues the past.
The decision to implement supply chain management therefore reaches much further into
the company than often anticipated by the literature on SCM, which focuses mostly on the
outreach of supplier’s supplier and customer’s customer (Ellif, 1996). SCM is about managing
suppliers, but is not primarily about managing suppliers. As already mentioned, supply chain
management does not begin at the gates of the company. On the contrary, our case studies
suggest that this is where it ends. The way suppliers are organized in relation to the firm depends
on the way internal positions are negotiated. As illustrated in our case studies it is not only the
purchasing functions that bring in external parties. Engineering functions do that as well, as
illustrated most notably at SuperDesign, where the engineering functions argue that even if in
principle it would be a neat idea to involve suppliers, this is not possible in practice because
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suppliers do not (unlike the engineering functions) understand what the customer expects. It goes
to show that suppliers and customers are present in the forefront of discussions because they
support arguments about internal positions. This does not suggest that the organization of
suppliers and customers is unimportant. However, it underlines why we should not take supply
chains for granted. They appear to be the result of firms realizing that in practice their ontology
is variable. This is something current theories on SCM tend to neglect. Our case studies go to
show that because there is no set definition of a firm that in turn would define the supply chain, it
also remains a problem to define the role of suppliers and customers, and these constituents can
in fact even be used to reorganize internal positions. What this shows is that the resource
allocation question is much less about accounting ‘costs’ and physical ‘constraints’ than it is
about the category of other ‘conditions’. As Gattorna and Walters (1996) argue:
Conditions are logical, non-numeric characteristics that must be respected in developing the
optimum allocation of resources. They usually reflect business considerations, such as policies,
contractual obligations, or customer service needs. Conditions can be described in terms of
expressions involving logical operators, such as: ‘if/then else’; ‘and/or’; ‘not/nor’ (P.258).

Our case studies do not contest these operators. They simply show that the logic is not
given. On the contrary, it is invented on the basis of numerous operative iterations - if purchasing
gets to control the suppliers, then SuperDesign engineering cannot continue its way of specifying
products and then EuroOil engineering cannot safeguard liability etc. But what this means in a
Latourian sense witness is that we cannot think about the conditions before first going through a
‘process of enlargement’ where operators are introduced and combined in order to articulate the
future boundaries of these two firms. Because there are very few limits to the number of ways
that these operators can be modelled this process is complex and as our case studies illustrate in
order to advance the process – and delimit the operators - both organizations must go through
another parallel process which is all about assessing the ‘transaction costs’ related to the various
scenarios introduced in relation to the SCM vision. This process in parallel suggests that the
premises of supply chain responsiveness may not be what we expected them to be based on the
hypothesis of decoupling points.
Supply Chain Responsiveness – The Transaction Cost Assessment of ‘firm boundaries’
Traditionally, SCM theories have described ’responsiveness’ as an effect of the ability to
think supply chain management from ‘customer’s customer to supplier’s supplier’ (Ellif, 1996).
In relation to this broad idea a clear quality of the ‘decoupling points hypothesis’ will be revealed
by seeking the answer to this question: how far can one extend the informational from the
material decoupling point?
Even if our case studies do not contest the decoupling hypothesis in principle, they
provide a very different account of how responsiveness results from supply chain management
practice. Perhaps the most important result is that our case studies illustrate how organizations
have the potential to design many different types of responsiveness.
Ultimately, our analysis suggests that responsiveness is defined through the actor network
that is able to command the organization of managerial and manufacturing competences and thus
the boundaries of the firm. However, as our analysis also suggests, this doesn’t happen
overnight. Before anyone rises to the position of being able to command how other parties
network with managerial / accounting technologies, internal functions and external customers
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and suppliers, the organization as a whole first goes through a process of debating the transaction
costs associated with different ways of doing things.
In both organizations it may be the clever cost controls that are most visible in the
purchasing functions’ arguments. But in both organizations we see that the accounting cost is
mobilized only to suggest that purchasing would be able to command their role – in spite of no
prior experience with this type of work. However, it is not the accounting cost argument that
explains the concerns we see in both organizations. In both places, purchasing and engineering
functions refer to the much broader idea of ‘transaction cost’ (Williamson, 1985).
At EuroOil the engineering functions argue that the transaction cost of not controlling
suppliers far outweighs the transaction gains of outsourcing manufacturing control, because the
company will lose the opportunity to double-check suppliers and learn from them in relation to
other projects. Purchasing disagrees because they think learning from suppliers is redundant:
there is no use for an in-house competence center. To them, the current ways of managing
suppliers incurs the opportunity cost of not being able to introduce accounting cost management
as a control and communications tool.
At SuperDesign the purchasing function argues that designing products independently of
suppliers incurs an opportunity cost in not being able to draw on their competences, and a
transaction cost in that sometimes products are designed without knowing whether suppliers can
deliver the specified qualities, which sometimes increases the accounting-based cost of quality
beyond what should be reasonable. The engineering functions counter this argument with
another transaction cost argument, which is that the current organization of roles and
responsibilities ensures that SuperDesign is able to design and manufacture products the
customer wants. In their view, including suppliers in design work equals a transaction cost
because SuperDesign will loose control over the way that products respond to SuperDesign’s
customer expectations.
Clearly, because the debate is about the allocation of internal positions in the two
companies, some of these arguments entail self-serving components. Regardless, they remain
important to our understanding of the constitution of supply chain responsiveness because they
illustrate how a change in the way that manufacturing and managerial competences are combined
presents companies with a very different transaction cost setting. Implementing SCM is not only
about streamlining and cost reduction: it is primarily about the premises on which companies
can nurture their core competences.
At EuroOil there is a dispute about whether the company has a technical competence or
not, which is not an issue at SuperDesign. Everyone – including purchasing - agrees that a
product design constitutes a core competence. However, they disagree about how this
competence is sustained over time. According to the purchasing function, this competence is
only sustainable if SuperDesign pools its manufacturing and managerial competences. But as the
engineering function argues, doing so will change the transaction cost setting under which the
company operates, and at the time of our studies the purchasing function did not have an answer
to this argument. They could not yet account for the type of responsiveness they envisioned. This
shows, on the one hand, that a component of the resource allocation problem - as modelled by
Gattorna and Walters, (1996) – certainly has to do with constraints; on the other hand, those
which the organizations discuss are transactional, not physical. The discussions are not so much
about what ‘we have or don’t have’. They are more about the consequences of different actor
networks, i.e., what will happen if we do or don’t do things in certain ways.
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Supply chain responsiveness is therefore not simply a function of ‘supplier’s supplier and
customer’s customer,’ and if it is a function of how far the informational and the material
decoupling points are extended from each other, this is only because an actor network has
emerged that has been able to organize firm boundaries based on a trading of different
transaction cost scenarios. In other words, it has become able to withstand organizational
criticisms and challenges (Briers and Chua, 2001).
Responsiveness does not result from separating the supply chain into a planning section
and a service section. It results from the actor networks’ combined ability to handle different
transaction cost scenarios related to the negotiation of organizational positions – internal
boundaries. In practice this comes down to solving the problem: what does it take to nurture our
core competences? As illustrated, this requires a process that first has to define its own firmspecific logic, which in EuroOil traditionally has been about separation of engineering
responsibilities, and in SuperDesign traditionally has been about manufacturing-based
integration of responsibilities.

Conclusions
The two case studies presented in this paper show that corporations struggle in order to
implement supply chain management. However, their struggle is not – as often presumed caused by their inability to transform theory into practice. The reason they struggle is because
they first have to establish new actor-networks within the organizations – apart from suppliers
and customers. Our research suggests that supply chain management has to be invented locally
before it can be extended globally. Supply chains do not exist independently of firms, because it
is not given what constitutes these firms.
The case studies illustrate that each company has a whole range of possibilities, and that
the outcome therefore remains ambiguous as long as there are no translations that are strong
enough to create a space and a pragmatism that organizes internal functions. In both
organizations purchasing may have a solution principle on which to elaborate. But in neither of
the two companies do they have a practical solution because they had not yet been able to deal
with the transaction cost-related arguments presented by the engineering departments. At the
time of our research everyone – including the engineering functions – remained in positions that
the SCM vision had made controversial, but they had begun a process of determining alternative
ways of organizing administrative and manufacturing assets in relation to external resources.
Our research suggests that supply chain responsiveness is not a function of volume and
quality of links within the supply chain. In each of the two companies we studied, there are a
several competing definitions of what it means to be responsive. Each of them translates the
SCM vision differently and in ways that favour certain parties to gain control over others.
Responsiveness, rather than being seen as a function of the constellation of outside parties,
should be seen as an effect of the internal struggles for centrality in the actor-networks. Those
who become nodes loose control over the type of responsiveness that results from different ways
of organizing, and in order not to lose positions, different parties blame the transaction costs
incurred with the different ways of organizing.
Our research builds on and adds to our understanding of the syntax presented by Ballou
et al (2000), in which it is argued that the coordination work of SCM takes place not only on an
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inter-organizational level but also on an ‘inter-’ and ‘intra-’functional level. Our research also
echoes and adds to Price (1996) who argues that current SCM theories fail to recognize the social
component of SCM struggles. But in contrast to others we do not argue in favor of applying any
one of the following: a ‘learning perspective’ (Price, 1996), a ‘process perspective’ (Cousins,
2002), or a ‘resource-based perspective’ (Coates et al. 2002). Our methodological stance is that
one should approach the scene being as open as possible to understanding how corporations in
practice work with preconceived and packaged concepts – such as, for example, ‘life-cycle
costing’ and ‘open-book accounting’ – in order to understand how such technologies are
networked into the social setting. Even if the hypothesis about ‘decoupling points’ makes a lot of
sense in principle, our research shows why corporations in practice cannot approach this
hypothesis without first working through numerous, firm-specific issues that modelling
hypotheses necessarily have to leave out. In practice, supply chain management does not begin at
the gates of the company. In order to decide on the decoupling points, corporations have to go
through a process of explicating transaction costs related to different scenarios which at the same
time brings them through a process of negotiating internal positions. What in the case of
SuperDesign and EuroOil seemed to influence the decoupling points the most were questions
like these: To what extent can we span our competences onto suppliers? To what extent can the
supplier understand the customers' expectations? How far can we allow the supplier to become a
partner? But, as our case studies and discussion illustrated, the answers to these questions need
not involve the suppliers. They depend much more on the way internal functions assess
transaction costs with different manufacturing scenarios and how they, in relation to these
assessments, are able to mobilize their own positions in relation to those internal and external
parties they aspire to inscribe.
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